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1. Introduction 
The future institutional environment for the coexistence of genetically modified crops 
(GM-crops)1, conventional crops and organic crops in Europe combines measures of 
ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability rules. Recognising Europe’s heterogeneity in 
farm structures, crop patterns and legal environments, the European Commission 
decided to follow the principle of subsidiarity and states that “measures for 
coexistence should be developed and implemented by the Member States.” 
(Commission of the European Communities 2003). Member States develop a variety 
of different coexistence rules and regulations (Beckmann, Soregaroli, and Wesseler, 
2006) that may have a profound impact on the adoption rate of GM-crops. The 
discussion on coexistence and the governance of the GM-technology, however, is not 
limited to Europe. There is an ongoing debate in the United States, Canada, New 
Zealand and other countries (see e.g. Kershen 2002; Smyth, Khachatourians and 
Phillips 2002; Conner 2003; Falck Zepeda, 2006).  
 
Against this background we ask the following two questions: How does ex-ante 
regulation and ex-post liability under irreversibility and uncertainty affect the 
adoption of GM crops? What are the implications for regional agglomeration of GM 
and non-GM crops?  
                                                          
1 There is some controversy about the use and meaning of the term genetically modified organism. We 
follow here the definition used by the FAO (Zaid et al., 2001), which defines a genetically modified 
organism as an organism “that has been transformed by the insertion of one or more transgenes.” (p. 
125), which applies to a single organism such as a seed corn or animal. 
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Our contribution differs from previous studies on the subject that analyse the 
economics of public regulations of biotechnology during the research and 
development phase, such as Larason and Knudson (1991). We consider GM-
technologies that have been approved by the regulatory body, e.g. the European Food 
Safety Agency (EFSA), as being safe for human consumption and the environment, if 
grown according to pre-defined regulations. The present paper provides a 
comprehensive framework for the evaluation of coexistence at the farm level, in terms 
of adoption decision, regional agglomeration, minimum farm size, and the 
consequential effects of policy measures.  
 
The literature on ex-ante safety regulations versus ex-post liability for harm discusses 
the welfare efficient conditions of using either one or both and assumes the utility 
derived from harmful action is sufficiently large (e.g. Shavell, 1987; Larson, 1996; 
Schmitz, 2000; Boyer and Porrini, 2004; Roe, 2004; Calcott and Hutton, 2006). One 
of the results from that literature is favouring ex-ante regulations in case the injurer is 
subject to bankruptcy if being held liable. 
 
We are more interested to discuss the situation where the utility is not sufficiently 
large and the harm causing firms are not subject to bankruptcy. In particular, we look 
at ex-ante regulations versus ex-post liabilities from the point of view of how this 
does effect technology adoption, firm growth and regional development. This is an 
aspect that so far has not been considered in the literature on ex-ante regulations 
versus ex-post liabilities. Further, while the standard literature only considers 
unilateral accidents where injurers can take precautionary actions or are forced to take 
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precautionary actions, we allow for responses of the victims and bargaining 
possibilities between injurer and victim. One analysis that comes close to our case is 
Viscusi and Moore (1993). The authors analyse the case of product liability on 
research and development and innovation, where liability risks may result in 
bankruptcy or in extremely high insurance costs. While their study considers 
investment in innovations and considers liability issues only, we analyse the case of 
adoption of innovation and consider ex-ante regulations as well as ex-post liability. 
Our results show that ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability can induce regional 
agglomeration of the harm causing firms and can have important implications for 
regional growth as access to technical innovations can be hindered or supported by the 
regulators choice of ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability rules. This welfare aspect 
so far has not been discussed in the relevant literature.  
 
In more detail, coexistence is assessed under the existence of costs related to ex-ante 
regulations and ex-post liability, the presence of irreversible costs and uncertainty, 
and the consequential comparative advantages of different types of farms in becoming 
GM or non-GM producers. The impact of irreversibility and uncertainty on the 
comparative advantage of GM farms versus non-GM farms is the central theme of the 
paper. This framework can also find empirical application as illustrated in the 
example provided in section six of the work.  
 
We proceed as follows. In section two we define what we mean by coexistence. In 
section three we introduce ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability under 
irreversibility and uncertainty into the model. Section four discusses the implications 
of ex-ante regulations and ex-post liabilities for technology adoption, and regional 
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agglomeration of adopting farms. Section five discusses the implications for policy 
analysis and in particular the link between technology adoption and minimum farm 
size. Section six presents an illustrative example from Germany demonstrating the 
relevance of the issues considered by the theoretical model. In section seven we 
conclude. 
 
2. A Definition of Coexistence 
The problem of coexistence is a classical “problem of social costs” as pointed out by 
Beckmann and Wesseler (2007). Farmers who plant GM crops may cause negative (or 
positive) external effects to non-GM or organic farmers through pollen drift or other 
forms of admixture. The admixture, in principle, can be two sided. GM crops may 
affect non-GM crops but non-GM crops may also affect GM crops. It is important to 
note here that the same physical effect, i.e. pollen flow, can have different economic 
impacts, depending on the institutional setting. The institutional and regulatory setting 
defines the rules of what is or is not to be called GM. In the case of GM crops, this 
largely depends on threshold levels and crop specificities and therefore it is not 
surprising that the definition of the threshold is subject to a strong political debate 
(Nischwitz et al., 2004).2  
 
Drawing from Beckmann and Wesseler (2007), the coexistence value (vc) of GM 
farming - G - (non-GM farming - N -) of farm i, will be denoted by 
iG
vcl  (
iN
vcl ) in case 
the GM farmer will be liable (l) for any harm caused by planting GM crops and by 
i
n
Gvc  ( i
n
Nvc ) in case the GM farmer will not be held liable (n). The interpretation of 
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liability is that in the case where the GM farmer will be liable the property right is 
with the non-GM farmer, in the sense that the non-GM farmer has the right to produce 
non-GM crops and GM farmers have to take measure to protect that right and in the 
case where GM farmer are not liable they have the property right to plant GM crops 
and the non-GM farmer have to take appropriate measures. 
 
Coexistence can than be defined by:  
“A state described by a set of policies exogenous to the farmers that results in the 
planting of ‘organic and/or non-organic-non-GM’ and ‘GM crops’ at the same point 
in time in a pre-defined region with at least one farm i where 
i iG N
vc vc>l l  and one 
where 
i iG N
vc vc<l l  under a non-GM-farmer property right system and at least one farm 
where 
i i
n n
G Nvc vc>  and one where i in nG Nvc vc<  under a GM-farmer property right 
system.” 
 
For achieving the state of coexistence, regulators use a number of policies that can be 
classified in ex-ante regulations or ex-post liability rules. Those policies do affect the 
possibility of coexistence. However, it is not obvious to which extent coexistence 
policies will contribute to reaching the state of coexistence. In the following analysis 
we will assume that the property right is with the non-GM farmer, meaning to say s/he 
has the right to plant non-GM crops and farmers planting GM crops have to 
compensate and/or prevent damages to non-GM farmers. This system reflects the 
current situation in the EU. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 In the EU the current food-labelling threshold is 0.9% for GM-food (Commission of the European 
Communities 2005). It should be noted here that for organic farming no threshold has been decided yet. 
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3. Ex-Ante Regulation and Ex-Post Liability 
3.1 Coexistence Value under Ex-Ante Regulation and Ex-Post Liability Rules 
The starting point is the definition of the GM farmer’s value function under ex-ante 
regulation and ex-post liability rules. The value function of the GM farmer will be 
affected when complying with regulations; moreover, the possibility of facing ex-post 
liability for damages from cross pollination adds additional costs to those farmers that 
plant GM crops. The value of planting GM crops at farm i can be defined as the value 
from GM cultivation ( )iGv , i i iG G Gp y c− , with iGp , iGy , iGc  as the respective farm level 
price, quantity and cost vectors, minus the costs related to liability and its control, λi. 
The coexistence value of GM farming of farm i under ex-ante regulation and ex-post 
liability is 
 
 
i iG G i
vc v λ= −l . [1] 
 
The expected costs related to liability are the sum of the costs of respecting ex-ante 
regulations, ri, and the value of expected ex-post tort liability tli: 
 
( )i i iE r tlλ = + . [2] 
 
The regulatory costs introduced in equation [2], ri, are the sum of the fencing and 
compensation costs under certainty. Following Kolstad et al. (1990) and Ewerhart and 
Schmitz (1998) expected ex-post tort liability, tli, can be written as 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
The commission proposes a 0.9% threshold level as well, which is heavily debated. 
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( )i i i itl d E jµ= ⋅ ⋅   [3] 
 
where, µi is the probability of causing an accident, in this case contamination of the 
neighbouring non-GM fields, di is the monetary value of the damage, and E(ji) is the 
expected probability that the injurer will pay the damages. In our case, E(ji), can be 
interpreted as a function of the court’s view and the probability of being sued by the 
neighbour who has suffered damage. From the previous equations the coexistence 
value function for the GM farmer, dropping the expectation operator to simplify 
notation, can be formulated as follows: 
 
  ( ) ( ), ( , ) , ( )
i iG G i i i i
vc v r s reg s reg d s reg j lawµ= − −l  [4] 
 
where s is the size of GM crops planted, reg is the enforced GM legal standard for the 
region (e.g. country or federal state) and law is the tort liability system of the region. 
 
Interpreting the variable reg as the minimum distance, z, one of the most common 
forms of ex-ante regulation, between the GM crop and the neighbouring non-GM crop 
we can write equation [1] as:  
 
  ( ) ( ), ( , ) , ( )
i iG G i i i i
vc v r s z s z d s z j lawµ= − −l  [5] 
 
Assuming 
iN
vc is not affected by GM farming (
i iN N
vc v= ) a profit maximizing farmer 
i would adopt GM crops if     0
i i iG G N
vc vc v∆ ≡ − >l l .  
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3.1 Introducing Irreversibility and Uncertainty 
So far it was assumed that incremental benefits are certain and the farmer did not face 
reduced costs while deciding to adopt the GM technology. However, it could be the 
case that some of the costs are irreversible: for example, the GM crop requires 
specific machinery or the GM cultivation could make it difficult for the farmer to 
switch back to the non-GM status. These difficulties could include additional 
practices for the control of volunteers or a required minimum number of years of non-
GM cultivation for a field to be considered for producing non-GM products. The 
multi-period time frame also adds uncertainty to the farmers’ adoption decision as 
future yields, prices and costs are not generally known with certainty. 
 
In the presence of net-irreversible costs, uncertainty and flexibility, the value of a GM 
crop is not simply the difference between the present value of future benefits and 
costs but the sum of this difference plus the value of the option to plant GM crops 
(Wesseler, 2003). More formally, when some costs are irreversible, costs and benefits 
are uncertain and the decision to adopt can be postponed, a profit maximizing farmer 
maximizes the option value of the adoption possibility. Hence, we can write for the 
adoption decision under irreversibility and uncertainty excluding ex-ante regulation 
and ex-post liability rules, with ∼ indicating the value of co-existing under 
irreversibility and uncertainty: 
 
 ( )  ( )max ( , ) ii i i i TG G G N iF vc E vc v v IR e ρ−⎡ ⎤∆ = ∆ −⎣ ⎦  [6] 
 
or including ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability rules: 
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 ( )   ( )( )max , , , ii i i i TG G G N i i iF vc E vc v v r tl IR e ρ−⎡ ⎤∆ = ∆ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦l l l  [7] 
 
with IRi the net-irreversible costs excluding irreversible regulatory costs and iIR
l  the 
net-irreversible costs including irreversible regulatory costs. 
 
There is some potential controversy about what we mean by net irreversible costs. IRi 
indicates the net-irreversible costs, the difference between irreversible costs Ii and 
irreversible benefits Ri, of farmers who adopt GM-crops. Both, Ii and Ri, are those at 
the private level and include sunk costs such as new machinery for higher density 
planting of herbicide tolerant soy beans or positive health benefits due to a change in 
pesticide use (Weaver and Wesseler, 2004). iIR
l  indicates the net-irreversible costs 
under regulation and liability rules. iIR
l  includes in addition to IRi irreversible 
transaction cost, tciIR , that may arise due to negotiations with neighbouring farmers. 
Some of the transaction costs are assumed to be irreversible, as if farmers move out of 
planting GM crops, time and money spent on arrangements with neighbours to 
comply with and reduce regulatory and liability costs are worthless. 
 
tc
i i iIR IR IR= +l  [8] 
with 
0, 1,...,i i iIR I R i k= − > ∀ =  [8a] 
0, 1,...,tc tc tci i iIR I R i k= − > ∀ =  [8b] 
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The uncertainty that in combination with the net irreversible cost creates the option 
value for adopting GM crops is represented by the following stochastic process: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i iG G G G id vc vc dt vc dz vc dqα σ∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆l l l l  [9] 
 
where 
i i iG G N i
vc v v r∆ = − −l  evolves under a combined geometric Brownian motion and 
Poisson process. α is the drift of the Brownian motion, dz is the increment of a 
Wiener process, dt is the marginal increment in time and dqi is the increment of a 
Poisson process. The first two terms on the right-hand-side of equation [9] are 
common for modelling incremental benefits of GM crops under irreversibility and 
uncertainty (e.g. Demont et al., 2004; Morel et al. 2003; Wesseler, 2003). The third 
term represents tort liability modelled as the risk of a jump in the profit when the 
farmer is held liable. More precisely, 
 
tdz dtε= , and  
0 with probability 1- dt
- with probability dt
i
i
i i
dq
γ
φ γ
⎧= ⎨⎩
 [10] 
 
where εt is normally distributed with zero mean and unit standard deviation, γi is the 
mean arrival rate of a Poisson process, and φi the percentage of the ex-post liability 
costs of 
iG
vc∆ l .  
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From the above equation and the opportune boundary conditions the standard rule for 
the adoption decision under irreversibility and uncertainty, assuming φ = 1, can be 
derived (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994):3 
 
* 1
1
( )
1
i
i i
i
G G i i i ivc vc IR
β ρ α γβ
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤∆ > ∆ = − +⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
l l l  [11] 
 
Equation [11] says adopt GM crops if the current incremental coexistence value of 
GM farming, 
i iG N
v v−  minus the regulatory costs ir , is greater than the hurdle value 
*
iG
vc⎡ ⎤∆⎣ ⎦l . This hurdle value depends among others on the regulatory and liability 
costs as they have an impact on the irreversible transaction costs and due to tort 
liability an impact on iγ . 
 
Please note, we get a farm specific hurdle rate, even if the drift and variance rate of 
the geometric Brownian motion are homogenous over all farms as the mean arrival 
rate of the Poisson process is farm specific and depends on the landscape and number 
and distance of non-GM farms in the neighbourhood. 
 
With the now specified decision rule of adopting GM crops considering ex-ante 
regulatory and ex-post liability costs under irreversibility and uncertainty, we can 
have a closer look at the coexistence issue and regional agglomeration. 
 
                                                          
3φi is assumed to be one to derive an analytical solution. Using a different value for φi requires finding a 
solution numerically. 
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4. Adoption and Spatial Agglomeration Effects under Irreversibility and 
Uncertainty 
4.1. Adoption Effects 
To see the effects of ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability rules on adoption and 
regional agglomeration we start by looking at the initial situation without any 
irreversibility and uncertainty as well as liability system. This situation is depicted in 
Figure 1. The horizontal axis illustrates the benefits for farmers staying non-GM and 
the vertical axis the benefits for becoming a GM-farmer. Point A1 indicates a situation 
where the incremental benefits from planting non-GM crops for farmer a are positive 
( )a aN Gv v> , whereas at point B1 the incremental benefits from GM crops for farmer b 
are positive ( )b bG Nv v> . Under the assumption that b bG Nv v>  and a aN Gv v>  the 
comparative advantage of the two farm is defined by 
 
( ) ( )1 b b a aG N N GC v v v v= − − −   [12a] 
 
This is represented by point C1 in the figure. As the incremental benefits of farmer b 
are larger than the incremental benefits of farmer a point C1 is above the 45°-degree 
line indicating a comparative advantage for farmer b.  
 
The situation changes with the introduction of irreversibility and uncertainty. The 
term 1
1
( )
1
i
i
i i i iIR
βκ ρ αβ
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
, representing the value of waiting, has an additive 
effect on the comparative advantage of the two farms: assuming 
;
b b a aG N N G
vc vc vc vc> > , 
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( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
2
.
b b a a
b b a a
G N N G
G b N N G a
C vc vc vc vc
v v v vκ κ
= − − −
= − − − − −  [12b] 
 
As depicted in Figure 2, irreversibility and uncertainty at the production level have the 
following implications. Firstly, incremental benefits from GM-crops are reduced due 
to the irreversibility and uncertainty effect ( iκ ). This is illustrated by a vertical 
downward movement of farmer b from point B1 to point B2. If farmer a is not affected 
the new comparative advantage is at point 2 /w oC  which is still above the 45°-degree 
line. But it is also reasonable to assume that farmer a would face irreversibility and 
uncertainty as well if s/he would consider adopting GM crops (see equation [12b]). 
Hence, under irreversibility and uncertainty the benefits of farmer a for staying non-
GM do increase. This is indicated by a horizontal move from point A1 to point A2. 
The new comparative advantage is indicated by point 2wC . This point is located below 
the 45°-degree line. Now, the comparative advantage has moved from GM farmer b to 
the non-GM farmer a. This effect is independent of ex-ante regulatory and ex-post 
liability costs and has already been studied for the adoption of GM crops (e.g. Demont 
et al., 2004; Morrel et al., 2003; Scatasta et al., 2006). 
 
Now, if the GM farmer is liable for possible damages, the costs for complying with 
the regulations have influences on the iκ  term, including the hurdle rate and 
irreversible costs, that becomes ( )1
1 1
i
i
i i i i iIR
βκ ρ α γβ
⎛ ⎞= − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
l l ; also, liability has an 
additive effect on the comparative advantage of the two farms: under the same 
assumptions of equation [12b], 
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( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
3
.
b b a a
b b a a
G N N G
G b b N N G a a
C vc vc vc vc
v r v v v rκ κ
= − − −
= − − − − − − −l l  [12c] 
 
The new situation is depicted in Figure 3. Again, we can observe two main effects. 
First, ex-ante regulatory and ex-post liability costs increase the hurdle value of 
adoption. This is indicated by a downward vertical move from point B2 to point B3. 
Please note, planting GM crops is still profitable for farmer b. Second, the value of 
staying non-GM either remains the same or further increases. The benefits costs for 
staying non-GM will remain the same for farmer a, if s/he is surrounded by GM-farms 
only and coexistence policies require to keep a distance to, inform and compensate 
non-GM farmers for harm. In that case, if s/he also becomes a GM-farmer there are no 
additional regulatory and liability costs as there is no non-GM farm left. Farmer a 
remains at point A2. The comparative advantage for staying non-GM in this case is 
indicated by point 3 /w oC . Hence, the benefits of staying non-GM further increase as 
indicated by point A3. The comparative advantage for the non-GM farmer further 
increases as indicated by the move to the right from point 3 /w oC  to point 
3
wC . 
 
It is important to recognize, that liability increases the irreversible costs due to 
additional negotiation costs. Every unit of irreversible costs demands more than one 
unit of incremental benefits. Regulation and liability rules have two effects on 
potential adopters. First, regulations directly decrease the incremental benefits (see 
equation 7). The adoption rate would decrease even without ex-post liability. Second, 
ex-post liability increases iκ l . In the appendix we show 
( )1
1
0
1
i
i
i i i i
β ρ α γ γβ
⎛ ⎞∂ − + ∂ >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
. This effect further increases the required 
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incremental benefits for adoption. The coexistence policy implications will be 
discussed in more detail in section five. 
 
Figure 3 clearly shows that ex-ante regulatory and ex-post liability costs for GM-
farmers reduce the adoption of the technology and favours non-GM farming. The 
opposite can be shown to hold for providing the GM farmer with the property right of 
planting GM-crops. The effect can be explained by using Figure 2. If the fencing costs 
of the non-GM farmer are equivalent to the irreversibility effect at production level 
then farmer a would move back from point A2 to point A1. The comparative 
advantage in the case of the production right is with the GM-farmer and the point 
illustrating the situation is point 2 /w oC . 
 
4.2. Agglomeration Effects 
The rules and regulations governing coexistence not only affect adoption directly, 
they also set incentives for the GM and non-GM farmer to collaborate with 
neighbours. Consider Figure 4 which is a comparison between the benefits and costs 
before and after the introduction of regulation and liability.  
 
The horizontal axis represents non-GM farms with 0
a aN G
v v− >  and the vertical axis 
GM farms with 0
b bG N
v v− > . Any point in the quadrant indicates the situation 
between a non-GM and GM farm. All points above (below) the 45°-degree line 
indicate situation where the incremental benefits of the GM (non-GM) farmer are 
larger than the incremental benefits for the non-GM (GM) farmer.  
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Three situations to adapt to ex ante regulations and ex post liability rules do exist. If 
the incremental benefits 
b bG N
ν ν−  for GM farmers are less than the costs to comply 
with the rules and regulation, they are below the legal barrier, they will not adopt the 
GM crop and become (or stay) non-GM farmers. This will be a likely situation for 
areas where the benefits from the technology are small and hence, potential adopters 
will stay non-GM. In those regions there will be no coexistence between GM and non-
GM farmers. This is in Figure 4 the shaded area below the legal barrier. An excellent 
example is the voluntary GMO free zone in the Uckermark of Germany (Nischwitz et 
al., 2005). 
 
In those areas where the incremental benefits for GM farmers are above the legal 
barrier and the incremental benefits for the farmer staying non-GM are smaller than 
the incremental benefits for the GM farmer, GM farmers can compensate the non-GM 
farmers and convince them to become GM farmers as well. This is the left shaded 
area above the legal barrier in Figure 4. In those regions an agglomeration of GM 
farmers will happen and again there will be no coexistence between GM and non-GM 
farmers.  
 
The third situation resembles regions where GM as well as non-GM farmers show 
high incremental benefits. In those regions the incentives for the GM farmer is to 
grow the crops, comply with the regulations and in case of liability pay for the 
possible damage. The GM farmer has no economic incentive to compensate the 
neighbouring non-GM farmer to become a GM farmer. There is also no economic 
incentive in that situation to become a non-GM farmer. In this situation coexistence 
between GM and non-GM farmers will emerge. 
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5. Implications for Policy Analysis 
The model presented in the previous sections allows to deal with the problem of 
coexistence in the context of policy assessment. Several policy tools and regulations 
can impact, directly or indirectly, on the variables of the model, therefore having an 
effect on GM-adoption and agglomeration of farms. Moreover, the model allows for 
heterogeneity of farms and it can possibly be extended to take into account for 
alternative distributions of farms’ characteristics. 
 
The variables that can be influenced by the policy and institutional environment are 
the costs of respecting ex-ante regulations (ri), the mean arrival rate of a Poisson 
process (γi), the percentage (φi) of the ex-post liability costs of 
iG
vc∆ l , the net-
irreversible costs under regulation and liability rules ( iIR
l ), and directly the value of 
GM (
iG
v ) and non-GM cultivation (
iN
v ).  
 
While the liability system applies ex-post, after harm has been done, ex-ante 
regulations are favoured by many EU member-states. The next paragraph illustrates 
the link between the parameters of the model and one particular form ex-ante 
regulation that deserves special attention: the minimum distance requirement between 
GM and non-GM farms. 
 
5.1. Minimum Distance Requirements, Farm Size and Adoption 
Minimum distance requirements are common instrument of coexistence policies 
among EU member states (Beckmann, Soregaroli, Wesseler, 2006). Soregaroli and 
Wesseler (2005) show that assuming reasonable functional forms minimum distance 
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requirements have two effects. On the one hand they increase the regulatory costs on 
the other hand they decrease the expected future liability costs. But minimum distance 
requirements do also induce a threshold affect. The minimum distance requirements 
do determine the minimum farm size needed for adoption. They also define for larger 
farms a minimum of area that needs to be set-a-side for non-GM crops.  
 
From equation [11], the relationship between minimum adoption size s and minimum 
distance requirements z, with zo indicating the area for distance requirement, the 
threshold effect, can be found from the following 
* 1
1
( ) 0 if
1
otherwise
i
i
i
o
G i i i i
o
H vc IR s z
z
β ρ α γβ
⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤= ∆ − − + = >⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟−⎨ ⎝ ⎠⎪⎩
l l
. 
 
As long as the minimum farm size is not greater than zo adoption will not be possible. 
This result is trivial but has already important implications for adoption. Ex-ante 
minimum distance requirements discriminate against smaller farms, farms with a size 
less than zo. This is not the only effect through which ex-ante minimum distance 
requirements discriminate against smaller farms. 
 
From the implicit function theorem it is possible to write for the case s>zo:  
H zs z
H s
∂ ∂∂ ∂ = − ∂ ∂  
and applying this to H provides 
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 [13] 
 
Given that at the break-even point of minimum size s an increase in the farm size 
implies a higher increase in the extra profits than in the extra ex-ante regulations and 
ex-post liability costs, the denominator of equation [13] can be considered to be 
positive around s and we can write: 
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 [14] 
 
Even if the sign for equation [14] is ambiguous, ex-ante minimum distance 
requirements do have a minimum farm size effect as can be seen by the last term. The 
two terms in the square brackets indicate the effect of an increase in minimum 
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distance requirements on ex-post liability cost. The first term is positive which can be 
explained by the positive effect of an increase in minimum distance requirements on 
future liability. The future value of the project increases and the value of waiting to 
adopt the technology does increase. The second term is negative and shows the effect 
of an increase in minimum distance requirements on the immediate benefits of 
adopting GMOs through a decrease in the actual discount rate ( )1 i i iρ α γ− + . Which 
effect dominates is not obvious (Soregaroli and Wesseler, 2005). For reasonable 
parameter values the overall effect of the two terms in square brackets is positive, the 
sign of equation [13] will be positive as well. Even if the sign of the square brackets is 
negative, irreversible cost do increase the minimum farm size for adoption. Only if 
0iIR z
∂ =∂
l
 there might be no minimum farm size effect because of irreversible costs. 
 
5.2. Ex-post Liability Rules and Adoption 
iγ  and iφ  influence directly the value of expected ex-post tort liability. iγ  is a 
function of the legislation and the court view, so it is directly linked with the legal 
enforcement of the law in the territory, but also to the farmer’ characteristics and ex-
ante actions to avoid liability (fencing and compensation costs). In the model 
presented, iγ  has a single value, but the modelling can be extended to consider a 
discrete or continuous distribution of the parameter to also accommodate for different 
values of iφ . Variations in iγ  can have a substantial influence on the comparative 
advantage of farms and on the results of regional agglomeration. In the appendix we 
show that an increase in iγ  increases iκ l  and, hence reduces immediate adoption. In 
case of a legal system using joint and several and strict liability in combination with 
strict liability as in the case for Germany the expected value of E(ji) will be much 
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higher as in the case of strict liability for GM farmers only, such as in Poland or 
Ireland. The expected value of ex-post liability costs in this case will be higher as 
under a fault-based liability system such as in Denmark. The expected value of being 
sued, E(ji), can be expected to be even lower in countries where liability is based on 
the civil law such as in the Czech Republic. The differences in the ex-post liability 
costs can be explained by the differences in E(ji). The differences in E(ji) can be 
explained by the easiness of suing the GM farmer. 
 
6. An Illustrative Example: Brandenburg, Germany 
The state of Brandenburg is located in the eastern part of Germany. As in all of East 
Germany, Brandenburg is characterised by large scale farming. In 2005, 6,669 farms 
cultivated 1.415 Million hectare of utilised agricultural area (UAA), of which 74% 
was arable land (Statistische Berichte 2006a). The average farm size was 200 hectare 
UAA, with 69% of the UAA cultivated in farms larger than 500 hectare. In 2005 the 
total cultivation of maize was 116,500 hectare, the majority of 94,000 hectare being 
green maize and 22500 ha grain maize. The share of maize in the arable land 
amounted to 11.1% (Statistische Berichte 2006b) 
 
Brandenburg shows a comparatively high share of organic agriculture. In 2005, 9.8% 
of the UAA was cultivated as organic (Statistische Berichte 2006c). This share varies 
significantly from region to region. While the NUTS 34 region Dahme-Spreewald 
showed the highest share of organic agriculture with 29.3%, Elbe-Elster had the 
lowest with 2.1%. Compared to conventional farming, maize is less important in 
organic agriculture and only green maize is grown which amounts to 2,300 hectare in 
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2005 (1,97% of the total maize area grown in Brandenburg). The share of organic 
maize in the organic arable land amounts only to 2.58%. 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
The European Corn Borer (ECB) is considered an important maize pest in 
Brandenburg. The problem is of great spatial heterogeneity. The eastern parts of 
Brandenburg are the mostly affected, in particular the area known as the Oderbruch 
(part of the NUTS 3 region Märkisch-Oderland). In the eastern parts of Brandenburg, 
the infestation frequency is estimated with 50% and above. In other parts of 
Brandenburg the infestation level is about 20% (Landtag Brandenburg 2005). Some 
studies estimate the total maize area infected annually by the ECB in Brandenburg 
with 20,000 hectares, which is 17% of the total maize area cultivated in 2005 
(Degenhart et al. 2003). 
 
Insert Table 2 and Table 3 
 
The German regulations for coexistence include mandatory registration of areas to be 
planted with GM crops 3-9 months before planting, following good agricultural 
practices for planting GM crops which includes a distance to neighbouring maize 
fields of 20 meters. Strict and joint and several liability applies in case the non-GM 
maize can not be marketed anymore due to adventitious presence of Bt-maize grain 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2006) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 NUTS refers to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics a geocode standard developed by 
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Since the Gentechnikgesetz (Bundesrat, 2005), the German law regulating the 
planting of GM crops, has come into force in January 2005, Brandenburg has been the 
leading state in the cultivation of GM-crops and Bt-maize in particular. In 2005, 341 
ha of GM-crops have been planted in Germany, 129 hectares of them (i.e. 38%) in 
Brandenburg. This share increased in 2006. From 951 hectares GM-crops planted in 
Germany in 2006 447 (47%) hectares are planted in Brandenburg. The by far most 
important variety is Bt-maize MON-00810-6, which amounts to up to 99.5% of all 
GM-crops grown in Brandenburg. Some farms withdraw the registered area partly or 
totally. In 2006, 11 notifications were withdrawn with a notified area of about 180 
hectare which is about one third of the totally announced area. Unfortunately, data on 
the area that was partly withdrawn does not exist in the GM-crop register. 
 
Märka, a regional grain trader, announced in 2005 to buy Bt-maize as well as non Bt-
maize grown within a distance of 100 meters to Bt-maize areas at market price. The 
objectives were to signal to GM farmers that there is a market for their product as well 
as to non-GM farmer that they can sell their grain maize without a down payment in 
case of adventitious presence of GM grain maize in the supposed to be non-GM grain 
maize. In combination with the relatively high ECB pressure and the large average 
farm size economic incentives for adopting Bt-maize are high. Degenhardt et al. 
calculate incremental benefits of 93€ per hectare for Bt-maize in the Oderbruch region 
of Brandenburg. This amounts to an annual average incremental benefit of about 
1340€ per Bt-maize growing farm. Despite this, only about 2.2% of the UAA for 
grain maize in Brandenburg has been planted with Bt-maize in 2006. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the EU for diving the EU in administrative divisions.  
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The model presented can explain the low adoption rate due to ex-ante regulatory and 
ex-post liability costs and the irreversibility effect. In the case presented the ex-ante 
regulatory costs can be considered to be low, as Märka’s policy actually controls for 
the distance requirements. Also, the actual ex-post liability costs are close to zero due 
to the promise by Märka to buy the harvest from neighbouring fields. Nevertheless, 
expected ex-post liability costs are high. Nischwitz et al. (2004) report results of a 
case study where the major reason of farmers who are voluntary members of a GM 
free zone5 (30% of the respondents) to become GM farmers, would be the removal of 
the risk of being held liable. In addition irreversible costs do exist in the form of 
getting acquainted with the German rules and regulations to be followed for planting 
Bt-maize. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The difference in incremental benefits and costs between GM and non-GM farmers 
provide incentives for regional agglomeration of either GM or non-GM farms. We 
show that the incremental benefits for becoming a GM farmer need to increase due to 
the irreversibility effect of the ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability rules compared 
to a situation without ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability rules. Minimum 
distance requirements between non-GM and GM farms increases the minimum farm 
size necessary for adopting the technology and therefore has a farm size effect as 
already pointed out by Beckmann (2005). The irreversibility effect of ex-ante 
regulations and ex-post liability rules increase the costs of minimum distance policies 
and hence increase the minimum farm size for adoption. 
                                                          
5 Until December 2006, five GM-free zones have been established in Brandenburg associating 204 
farmers and approximately 80.140 ha UAA, which amounts to 5.6% of the total UAA (GFR 2006). 
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The minimum distance requirements that many countries consider for or have already 
included in their coexistence policy discriminates against smaller farms. This has 
implications for the distribution of adopting farms. Areas with on average smaller 
farm sizes will experience lower rates of adoption and a reduction in their 
competitiveness. This discriminatory aspect of an ex-ante regulation has so-far not 
been considered within the literature on the effects of ex-ante regulations versus ex-
post liability rules. A solution for those areas is either all farmers adopt the technology 
or none, and in the latter case, becoming a GM-free zone.  
 
The example of Brandenburg demonstrates that low adoption of an otherwise 
economical technology is a relevant issue and can be explained by using our model. 
The question to what extent ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability and the 
irreversibility effect do prevent the adoption of GM crops in Europe is an empirical 
one. We have provided with our analysis a theoretical framework that can be used for 
such an empirical study. As Smyth and Kershen (2006) have pointed out such kind of 
model may not be limited to the case of GM crops only. 
 
Further, our results suggest a combination of ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability 
rules is superior over ex-ante regulations as precautionary measures only, except for 
the trivial case where ex-ante regulations are supposed to stop GM planting at all. 
This can be explained by the fact that ex-ante regulations of GM crop planting can not 
prevent harm by 100 per cent as commonly assumed in most of the law and 
economics papers. The remaining challenge is a formal proof of this claim. 
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Appendix. Proof of 0i iκ γ∂ ∂ >l .  
To improve the readability of the equations the following notation will be used: 
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Note: αi is the drift rate, σi2 the variance of a geometric Brownian motion, ρi the 
discount rate and γi the mean arrival rate of a Poisson process. i indicates the i-th 
farm. 
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Assuming 0iα ≥  the term 2 i
i i
α
σ υ  can be ignored and we get 
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Equation [A2] will be true, if 1i
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Figure 1. Distribution of adopter and non-adopters without net-irreversible costs 
and ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of adopter and non-adopters with net-irreversible 
production costs and without ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of adopter and non-adopters with net-irreversible 
production costs under ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability. 
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Figure 4: Agglomeration effects induced by ex-ante regulation and ex-post 
liability 
 
 
0
a aN G
v v− >  
0
b bG N
v v− >  
GM farmer will switch to 
non-GM crops 
GM farmer 
will 
compensate 
non-GM 
farmer for 
not growing 
non-GM 
Coexistence
( )1
1 1
a
a
a a a a ar IR
β ρ α γβ+ − +−
l  
 36
 
Table 1. Maize cultivation in Brandenburg, 2005 
 Hectares Percent 
Total cultivated maize 116,500 100 
Green maize 94,000 80.69 
Grain maize 22,500 19.31 
Organic green maize 2,300 1.97 
Vulnerable to corn borer* 20,000 17.17 
Bt-maize 2005** 129 0.11 
 
Source: Statistische Berichte (2006b, c), * Degenhardt et al (2003), **Standortregister 
(2006) 
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Table 2. Cultivation of GM-crops in Brandenburg and Germany, 2005-2006 
 2005 2006 
 Hectares % Hectares % 
Germany 341.59 100 951.32 100 
Brandenburg 129.42 37.9 447.48 47.0 
 
Source: Standortregister, 26.06.2006 
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Table 3. Cultivation of Bt-Maize MON-00810-6 in Brandenburg 
 2005 2006 
Notifications to grow Bt-maize, number 8 37 
Partly withdrawn notifications, number  4 11 
Totally withdrawn notifications, number n.a. 6 
Totally withdrawn notified Bt-maize area, 
hectare 
n.a. 180.52 
Cultivated Bt-maize area, hectares 128.69 446.66 
Average cultivated Bt-maize field size, hectares  16,08 14.41 
 
Source: Standortregister, 26.06.2006 
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